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Neighbor's Yard, You Might Be Liable to Anyone 
Injured There· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the California Supreme Court's holding in Alcaraz v. Vece, 1 
the rationale for imposing adjacent premises liability was reasonably 
clear. "Although a landowner is most commonly held liable for injuries 
that occur on his property, there are occasions when a landowner may be 
liable for a dangerous condition, which results in injury off the pre-
mises."2 
The occasions when landowners are typically held liable for injuries 
which occur on adjacent premises are when: (1) the adjacent landowner 
has exercised substantial control over the land where the injury occurred 
or over the hazard that caused the injury;3 (2) the adjacent landowner has 
received a direct benefit or advantage when the plaintiff uses the neigh-
boring land which caused the injury;4 (3) the adjacent landowner has ex-
ercised substantial control over the bordering land, and that landowner 
receives a benefit from the plaintiff's use of the connecting land;5 (4) the 
adjacent landowner failed to take reasonable steps to reduce the chance of 
a foreseeable injury occurring on adjacent property;6 or (5) the land 
* Copyright © 1998 by Thomas D. Jex. 
I. 929 P.2d 1239 (Cal. 1997). 
2. Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., Inc., 608 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
See Harry v. Smith, 893 P.2d 372, 375 (Nev. 1995); See also Jones v. Gillen 504 So. 2d 575 (La. 
Ct. App. 1987); Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985); Isaacs v. Huntington 
Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985). 
3. See Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 952-953 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing 
several cases where property owner was held liable for injuries occurring on adjoining property); 
See also Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981); Hamilton v. Gage Bowl, Inc., 8 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Evidence of substantial control goes beyond mere 
maintenance of the adjacent land. The evidence of substantial control must rise to the level of a 
landowner treating neighboring property as an integral part of his own; or a notorious and open 
public display of control. /d. 
4. See Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 170 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946); Ross v. Kirby, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Southland Corp. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
57, 62-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
5. See Princess Hotels lnt'l, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457. 459 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995); See Swann v. Olivier, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
6. See Limberhand, 706 P.2d at 499 (holding that the fact that an "instrumentality causing 
harm is located adjacent to the landowner's property" does not bar an action against a landowner 
for injuries sustained by "persons properly using the landowner's premises," where "the 
instrumentality poses a clear and foreseeable danger"); Gayden v. City of Rochester, 539 N.Y.S.2d 
211, 212 (App. Div. 1989) (holding an owner of property adjacent to a concrete waterway liable 
for drowning death of a seven year old boy). If the possessor of the land realizes or should have 
realized that an artificial condition on adjacent land poses an unreasonable risk of harm and 
reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe, then the possessor of land is subject to 
127 
128 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
owner created the hazard on the nearby land, and that hazard caused the 
injury.7 
Alcaraz greatly expands both the scope and uncertainty of premises 
liability. Alcaraz disregards any precedent which subjects landowners to 
liability only when they have exercised substantial control over neighbor-
ing land which caused injury.8 The court ignores prior case law providing 
examples of how much control is enough to be considered substantial9 by 
holding that evidence of mowing the lawn of a city owned strip of land 
where an injury occurred may10 rise to the level of sufficient control to 
create a duty in the adjacent landowner to warn of any potential dangers 
on that strip of IandY The court undermines the certainty and reliability 
of the traditional "substantial control" analysis for imposing premises 
liability and the result is a rule of law with no clear limits. 
Contrary to precedent, the court states that in order to hold a land-
owner responsible for injuries occurring on adjacent property it is not 
necessary that the landowner derive a commercial benefit from the por-
tion of the property which caused the injury. 12 Once again, the court 
abandons a predictable analysis for imposing premises liability. 
Additionally, the court does not analyze in detail the issue of 
foreseeability. Scattered throughout the opinion are references to the im-
portance of a landowner's "actual notice" of a hazard on adjacent land as 
another justification for holding landowners liable for off-premises inju-
riesY Tragically, the court fails to emphasize the issue of whether, in 
Alcaraz, the landowner knew or should have known of the potential dan-
ger on the city-owned strip of neighboring land. 
Before Alcaraz, a landowner knew that his potential liability for in-
juries occurring on neighboring land would depend on whether he: (1) 
exercised substantial control over the neighboring land; 14 (2) received a 
liability for injuries caused by the artificial condition. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 364 (1996). 
7. See Carter v. City of Houma, 536 So. 2d 573, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1988). Since the 
landowner in Alcaraz clearly did not create the hazard which caused the injury, this justification 
for holding an adjacent landowner responsible for injuries occurring on an adjoining land will not 
be thoroughly discussed in this Note. 
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text for a full discussion of prior case law 
illustrating how much control over adjacent land is sufficient to create a duty. 
10. The court sent the case back to a jury to decide whether the landowner's actions were 
sufficient to give rise to a duty. 929 P.2d at 1253. 
II. See id. See infra notes 20-50 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the facts 
and reasoning in Alcaraz v. Vece. 
12. See 929 P.2d at 1247-50. 
13. 929 P.2d at 1244 (stating that possessor of land who knows of hazard on adjacent 
property has duty to warn or protect third parties). 
14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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benefit from the plaintiff's use of the neighboring land; 15 (3) exercised 
control and received a benefit; 16 or (4) failed to take reasonable steps to 
reduce the chance of a foreseeable injury occurring on neighboring 
land. 17 Now, after Alcaraz, a landowner cannot rely on the first traditional 
rule of substantial control because simply mowing a lawn might be 
enough control to give rise to a duty. 18 The court also provides no further 
guidance as to how much control is substantial control. Further, a land-
owner cannot rely on the second traditional rule of receiving a benefit 
because the Alcaraz court held a "benefit" was unnecessary to the deter-
mination of adjacent premises liability. Landowners can no longer rely on 
the third traditional rule of "control and benefit" because the Alcaraz 
court, as mentioned previously, held the "benefit" portion of the analysis 
to be unnecessary. Finally, landowners may no longer rely on the fourth 
traditional rule of failure to take reasonable steps to reduce the chance of 
a foreseeable injury occurring on neighboring land because the Alcaraz 
court did not even address this critical issue. Accordingly, a landlord is 
left with uncertainty as to what factors will determine adjacent premises 
liability. 
This Note examines Alcaraz and concludes that applying the cer-
tainty, predictability and reliability of the traditional standards for impos-
ing adjacent premises liability would have resulted in a more reasonable 
outcome in Alcaraz. Part II of this Note reviews the facts and the court's 
reasoning in Alcaraz. Part III analyzes the traditional approaches to adja-
cent premises liability, 19 applies these traditional approaches to the facts 
in Alcaraz, and provides a better analysis for determining adjacent pre-
mises liability. 
II. ALCARAZ V. VECE 
A. Facts 
Plaintiff, Gilardo C. Alcaraz, was injured when he stepped on a bro-
ken water meter box20 located on a narrow strip of land in front of the 
apartment complex where he was a tenant.21 Alcaraz sued his landlord, 
Peter Vece, and the other owners of the property22 seeking damages under 
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
18. The holding in Alcaraz. of course, will only be binding precedent on courts in 
California. This Note, however, will consider the Alcaraz decision to be persuasive in other 
jurisdictions. 
19. See supra notes 3·7 and accompanying text. 
20. "The cover of the water meter box was either missing or broken." 929 P.2d at 1240. 
21. See id. 
22. For purposes of this Note, the name Peter Vece represents all of the owners of the 
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a theory of premises Iiability.23 However, the strip of land containing the 
water meter box was not owned by Vece, but was owned by Redwood 
City?4 Vece moved for a summary judgment arguing that he could not be 
held liable for an injury occurring on property owned by the city.25 Plain-
tiff opposed the summary judgment motion by asserting that the defen-
dant landlord had control over this strip of city-owned land, and therefore 
had a duty to warn of the potential hazard or repair the meter box.26 This 
"control," maintained Alcaraz, was evidenced by the fact that Vece' s gar-
dener mowed that strip of city owned lawn where the meter box was lo-
cated when he mowed Vece's lawn and that after the accident, Vece 
erected a fence around the meter box.27 
The trial court granted Vece' s motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that "no triable issue of fact existed, because [Vece] neither 
owned nor exercised control over the meter box .... "28 
The California Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment of 
the trial court.29 The appellate court agreed with the trial court that 
" 'there was no triable issue as to the fact of ownership of the meter box, 
because defendants neither owned nor exercised control over the meter 
box.' "30 However, the court concluded that the trial court erred in grant-
ing the summary judgment motion "because there existed a 'triable issue 
of fact as to whether ... defendants' actual or apparent control over im-
mediately adjacent premises and the foreseeability of injury ... created a 
duty ... to either warn plaintiff ... or protect him ... or both.' "31 The 
court reasoned that Vece's gardener's maintenance of the lawn surround-
ing the meter box and Vece's "actual notice of the broken or missing 
cover32 gave rise to a duty to protect or warn [Alcaraz].'m The California 
Supreme Court held that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether 
property. 
23. See 929 P.2d at 1240-41, 1256. 
24. See id. at 1241-42. Alcaraz admitted at oral argument that he had "not preserved his 
right to [bring suit against the City] because he did not file the required claim within the statutory 
time" pursuant to sections 905 and 911.2 of the California Government Code. !d. at 1256 n.1. 
25. See id. at 1241. 
26. See id. at 1241-42. 
27. See id. 
28. ld. at 1242. 
29. See id. 
30. !d. 
31. !d. 
32. A neighbor testified at trial that he had informed the Water Company meter readers and 
Vece that the cover of the meter box was either broken or missing. See 929 P.2d at 1242. 
33. !d. 
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Vece' s actions34 reached a level of sufficient control over the premises to 
give rise to a duty to warn or protect.35 
B. Reasoning 
The California Supreme Court first reasoned that the law "requires 
persons 'to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably 
safe condition.' "36 Thus, Vece's not owning the land surrounding the me-
ter box does not automatically exempt him from any potentialliability.37 
The court referred to Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 38 stating 
that "a defendant who lacks title to property still may be liable for an in-
jury caused by a dangerous condition on that property if the defendant 
exercises control over the property."39 
The court disapproved of any language in Princess Hotels 
International, Inc. v. Superior Court40 or Swann v. Olivier41 which held 
that a landlord is liable for injuries occurring on adjacent property if the 
landowner exercises control over and derives a direct benefit from that 
property.42 The court concluded that this language in Princess Hotels and 
Swann was unnecessary to the decisions of those cases. 
Finally, the court explained that the existence and scope of a duty of 
care are normally questions of law for a court to decide. 43 However, the 
role of the jury is not eliminated in determining if a duty exists.44 The 
court held that "a trier of fact could find ... that [Vece] exercised control 
over the property on which the meter box was located."45 In other words, 
a jury could hold Vece responsible for the reasonable safety of the city-
owned narrow strip of land because Vece's gardener mowed the strip of 
land, and Vece put a fence around the broken meter box after the injury. 
A jury could find that the actions of Vece' s gardener amount to sufficient 
control to give rise to a duty to protect or to warn. 
34. Vece's gardener mowing the strip of lawn where the meter box was located and Vece 
erecting a fence around the meter box after the accident. 
35. 929 P.2d at 1253. 
36. /d. at 1243 (quoting Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 
1993)). 
37. See id. 
38. 170 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946). 
39. 929 P.2d at 1244. 
40. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
41. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
42. See 929 P.2d at 1248-51; 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559; 28 Cal. Rptr. at 28. 
43. 929 P.2d at 1247 n.4. 
44. See id. 
45. /d. at n.4 
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In holding that a landowner who mows a strip of lawn46 may be liable 
for injuries occurring on that lawn, the California Supreme Court in 
Alcaraz ignores the precedent outlining the traditional occasions when 
landowners are typically held liable for injuries which occur on adjacent 
premises.47 The court undermines the first traditional basis for imposing 
adjacent premises liability, substantial control, by holding that mere 
maintenance could be sufficient control to give rise to a duty.48 The sec-
ond and third traditional basis for imposing adjacent premises liability is 
receiving a benefit from the plaintiff's use of the land. This basis is re-
voked as the court disapproved of language in any cases requiring that a 
landowner receive a direct benefit from the plaintiff's use of the land in 
order to hold the landowner liable.49 Also, the fourth traditional basis for 
imposing adjacent premises liability, foreseeability, is not emphasized as 
a significant requirement. 50 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
The traditional approach to imposing liability for off-premises inju-
ries provides landowners with a sense of predictability concerning their 
potential liability. In other words, landowners ought to know what kinds 
of acts for which they will incur liability for injuries occurring on nearby 
land. Until the holding in Alcaraz, landowners were aware that if they 
exercised substantial control over neighboring property, they could be 
liable for any injuries occurring on the property.51 Prior to Alcaraz, land-
owners also knew that if they did not receive a direct benefit from the 
plaintiff's use of the adjacent land, then they would not likely be subject 
to liability for injuries occurring on the adjacent land. 52 Furthermore, case 
law concerning off-premises liability emphasized that if an adjacent land-
owner knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on neighbor-
ing land and did nothing to reduce the chance of injury, then the adjacent 
landowner could be subject to liability for injuries occurring on the 
neighboring land.53 
46. The court held that a landowner who mows a strip of lawn and erects a barrier around 
the meter box after the injury could rise to the level of sufficient control. See id. The issue of 
subsequent remedial measures as admissible evidence (erecting the fence around the meter box after 
the injury) is beyond the scope of this note and will not be discussed. 
47. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
48. 929 P.2d at 1253. 
49. /d. at 1249-50. 
50. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
51. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
53. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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The analysis portion of this Note will discuss prior cases holding that 
(I) a landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby pre-
mises if the landowner has exercised substantial control over the nearby 
premises, (2) a landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a 
nearby premises if the landowner has received a direct benefit or advan-
tage when the plaintiff uses the feature on the land which caused the in-
jury, (3) a landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a 
nearby premises if the landowner has received both a benefit and has ex-
ercised substantial control over the nearby premises, and (4) a landowner 
may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby premises if the land-
owner knew or should have known of the potential danger on the nearby 
land and has failed to take reasonable steps to reduce the chance of a 
foreseeable injury. 
A. A landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby 
premises if the landowner has exercised substantial control over the 
nearby premises 
Many cases holding landowners liable for off-premises injuries are 
predicated on the idea of the landowner exercising substantial control 
over the adjacent premises. 54 Because a landowner can be held liable for 
injuries occurring on adjacent premises if the landowner exercises "con-
trol" over the adjacent premises, the question then becomes: how much 
control is sufficient control to give rise to a duty? The reasoning from 
Hamilton v. Gage Bowl,55 Kormanyos v. Champlain Valley Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association, 56 and Husovsky v. United States57 sheds light 
on this question. 
I. Case law 
In Hamilton, a parking lot owner was not liable to a patron who was 
injured when a sign fell from an adjacent building that was not owned by 
the parking lot owner.58 The plaintiff argued that the parking lot owner 
54. See Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Cal. 1981) (" '[T]he duties owed 
in connection of land are not invariably placed on the person [holding title] but, rather, are owed 
by the person in possession of the land because [of the possessor's] supervisory control over the 
activities conducted upon, and the condition of, the land'") (quoting Husovsky v. United States. 
590 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); See also Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 430 P.2d 68, 73 
(Cal. 967) (holding that when determining adjacent premises liability, "[t]he crucial element is 
control"); Low v. City of Sacramento, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (holding 
"control dominates over title"). 
55. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1992). 
56. 583 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1992). 
57. 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
58. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821, 823. 
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exercised sufficient control over the wall from which the sign fell to war-
rant imposition of a duty on the parking lot owner.59 As a measure of the 
parking lot owner's control, the plaintiff pointed to the fact that the park-
ing lot owner had placed some touch-up paint on the wall60 and that this 
constituted sufficient control over the wall to justify imposing a duty on 
the parking lot owner.61 The court held that this single sign of control did 
not rise to the level of sufficient control to justify imposing a legal duty. 62 
Painting a wall is akin to mowing a small strip of lawn. If, in Hamil-
ton, the court concluded that painting a wall is not enough control to jus-
tify imposing a duty on the landowner, then mowing a small strip of lawn 
also is not enough control to justify imposing a duty. Unfortunately, the 
Alcaraz court felt that the question of whether mowing a small strip of 
lawn is enough control to justify imposing a duty was a question for the 
jury to decide, leaving landowners unsure of what acts constitute substan-
tial control because this question will be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, in Kormanyos v. Champlain Valley Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, the New York Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of how much control is sufficient to justify imposing a duty on an adja-
cent landowner.63 In this case, a child was injured when his bicycle skid-
ded on a patch of sand and gravel on a sidewalk. The sidewalk was be-
tween a church and a bank.64 The child brought an action against both the 
bank and the church.65 Although the church did not own the sidewalk, 
counsel for the child contended that the church controlled the sidewalk.66 
As evidence of the control, counsel for the child pointed to the fact that 
the church shoveled or plowed snow off of the sidewalk in the winter for 
its convenience.67 The court ruled that evidence of occasional shoveling 
of snow was not sufficient control to give rise to a duty of care.68 Once 
again, shoveling snow is comparable to mowing a small strip of grass. If 
the court concluded in Kormanyos that shoveling snow is not enough 
control to justify imposing a duty on the landowner, then mowing a small 
strip of lawn should also not be enough control to justify imposing a duty. 
Husovsky v. United States is another case concerning the amount of 
control necessary to give rise to a duty of care.69 In this case the plaintiff 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. 583 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
64. /d. at 539. 
65. See id. 
66. /d. at 540. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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was driving through a federally owned and maintained public park when 
a tree fell on his car.70 The tree stood on land which the United States 
government maintained but did not own.71 The court ruled that the United 
States government exercised sufficient control over the land to give rise 
to a duty of care.72 However, the evidence of control went beyond mere 
maintenance. The United States government agreed with the government 
of India regarding the use of the land and the placement of markings bear-
ing the government of India's insignia.73 The Indian government agreed 
with the United States government "to 'preserve the present, natural, 
park-like character'" of its land.74 The court based on these and other fac-
tors decided that such evidence consisted of a "notorious and open public 
display of control."75 Since the court in Husovsky held that the level of 
control must go beyond "mere maintenance" in order to rise to sufficient 
control to justify holding the adjacent landowner to a duty/6 then mowing 
a small strip of lawn (mere maintenance) falls below the level of suffi-
cient control to give rise to a duty of care. 
70. See id. at 948. 
71. See id. The land was owned by the government of India. The United States government 
tried to purchase the land in 1945, but the government of India refused to sell it. See id. at 949. 
72. See id. at 953. 
73. See id. 
74. /d. at 949. 
75. !d. at 953; see also Donnell v. Cal. W. Sch. of Law, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988). In this case, the plaintiff, a student at the defendant law school, left the defendant's 
building after dark and headed towards his car. While walking on a public sidewalk bordering the 
building, he was attacked by an unknown assailant. The plaintiff alleged that by failing to provide 
parking for its students, the defendant forced him to walk through a high crime area. Despite the 
defendant's knowledge of the danger, it provided neither warning nor other protective measures, 
such as security guards or lights or monitors on the building. Summary judgment for defendant 
was affirmed. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's alleged duty to take reasonable steps to 
protect its invitees from foreseeable criminal assaults on the sidewalks providing immediate access 
to its building was based on its power to control the sidewalk by placing lights or monitors on its 
own building. However, merely havinx the power to influence or affect adjoininx property does 
not amount to control under premises liability law. See id. at 205. 
76. The three discussed cases, Hamilton, Kormanyos, and Husovsky do not involve a 
landlord/tenant relationship like the parties in Alcaraz. They involve a building owner/customer 
relationship (Hamilton), a landowner/child or passerby relationship (Kormanyos), and a 
landowner/adult or passerby relationship (Husovsky). Nonetheless, subjecting the landowner to 
possible liability in Alcaraz did not turn on the landowner's status as a landlord. The 
landlord/tenant relationship in Alcaraz was not crucial to the court's holding. The person injured 
by the water meter box could have been a passerby and the court would have applied identical 
reasoning. There is nothing in the court's opinion which emphasizes that its decision turned on the 
parties' status as landlord and tenant. The critical relationship is simply that one party owns land 
near to the area where another party is injured. As such, Hamilton, Kormanyos, and Hu.wwsky 
apply to Alcaraz by analogy. 
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2. Comparing the traditional substantial control test to the facts in 
Alcaraz 
Mere maintenance is not sufficient to impose a duty on an adjacent 
premises landowner.77 The control must be substantial. Applying touch-
up paint to a neighboring building or shoveling snow on a sidewalk does 
not meet the standard of substantial control giving rise to a duty.78 As 
such, in the case at hand, a gardener mowing the strip of land containing 
the water meter box does not rise to the level of substantial control. Sim-
ply exercising slight control over the adjacent premises containing a dan-
gerous condition is not dispositive of a duty. The Alcaraz court should 
have considered this control factor in favor of the landowner. 
By holding that a jury will determine a landowner's level of control, 
Alcaraz has replaced a predictable body of law79 with an unpredictable 
and limitless precedent. Allowing a jury to decide on a case-by-case basis 
what amount of control gives rise to a legal duty of care will inevitably 
lead to a wide range of holdings. Landowners will not be able to know 
with any degree of certainty what amount of control gives rise to a duty 
because the requisite amount will vary from jury to jury. 
B. A landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby 
premises if the landowner receives a direct benefit or advantage when 
the plaintiff uses the feature on the land which caused the injury 
Other cases holding landowners liable for off-premises injuries are 
rooted in the idea that the landowner receives a direct benefit or advan-
tage when the plaintiff uses the feature on the land which caused the in-
Jury. 
1. The cases 
Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc. held that the landowner 
must receive a direct benefit or advantage when the plaintiff uses the land 
or the feature on the land which caused the injury. 80 In that case, the pro-
spective patron of a Mexican restaurant located in a commercial building 
fell while stepping down from a concrete curb onto a private walkway as 
she was approaching the side entrance to the building in the dark. 81 The 
court held that both the restaurant owner (a tenant in the building) and the 
commercial landlord could be liable for the injuries. The commercial 
77. See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
80. 170 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946). 
81. See id at 7. 
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landlord was potentially liable because the patron used the walkway to 
enter the restaurant, and the walkway did not have adequate lighting or 
guard rails. The tenant could be held liable because he had once installed 
a neon sign which was connected to the single light. The tenant therefore 
had "a limited right of control" over that portion of the premises.82 The 
customer's use of the adjacent walkway directly benefitted the landowner 
and the tenant's restaurant. In Alcaraz, Vece did not receive a benefit be-
cause Alcaraz walked on the small strip of grass in front of the apartment 
complex. Accordingly, Vece should not be responsible for Alcaraz's inju-
nes. 
Similarly, in Ross v. Kirby, 83 a prospective patron fell over a drainage 
berm located on a private walkway on the way to the back entrance of a 
restaurant.84 The berm was similar to a speed bump and prevented rain 
from entering the restaurant.85 The berm was just three feet from the res-
taurant's door and was partly on the restaurant's property. In addition, the 
paint that had once made it visible had been worn away by the normal 
foot traffic from the restaurant.86 The court, following the holding in 
Johnston, emphasized that the restaurant exercised control over the entire 
berm and was benefitted by the location of the walkway.87 Again, in the 
case at hand, Vece received no benefit from Alcaraz's use of the city 
owned strip of lawn located in front of the apartment complex where 
Alcaraz was injured. 
One of the more recent cases in this "benefit" category is Southland 
Corp. v. Superior Court. 88 In Southland, a convenience store customer 
was attacked in a vacant, unpaved parking lot next to the store, but the 
area of the attack was about "ten feet beyond the easterly boundary of the 
property leased to the store."89 The court held that seven factors justified 
the possibility of a jury finding that the store "exercise[ d] a sufficient 
control over the lot so as to legally permit the imposition of a duty to 
those customers using the lot."90 These factors are the following: the in-
adequacy of the store's own parking spaces, the regular use of the lot by 
the store's customers, the store's right (under its lease) to the nonexclu-
sive use of the lot for customer parking, the store owner's awareness of 
the regular use of the lot by the store's customers, the commercial benefit 
82. /d. at 9. 
83. 59 Cal. Rptr. 60 I (Ct. App. 1967). 
84. See id. at 602. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 602-03. 
87. See id. at 604. 
88. 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1988). 
89. /d. at 58. 
90. /d. at 62-63. 
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the store received from the lot, the loitering by local juveniles on the 
property, and the occasional removal of the juveniles by store employ-
ees.91 
2. Comparison of the traditional benefit requirement to the facts in 
Alcaraz92 
The court in Alcaraz disapproved of language in other cases which 
required holding a landlord liable for an injury that occurs on adjacent 
property when the landlord derives a direct benefit or advantage from the 
property that caused the injury.93 Consequently, a rule of law which pro-
vided landowners with some predictability has now been disapproved by 
the California Supreme Court. 
Liability in Johnston, Ross, and Southland Corp. is rooted in some 
attribute of the adjacent property whose use by the plaintiff directly bene-
fitted the landowner. Courts appear to be justifying holding landowners 
liable for off-premises injuries due to some connection between the injury 
and the landowner's conduct. To establish this "connection" courts look 
for a benefit or an advantage that the landowner acquires when the plain-
tiff uses the area where the injury occurs.94 Without this connection, 
courts are not justified in holding the landowner responsible for injuries 
occurring on adjacent premises. Holding landowners liable with no con-
nection between the injury and the landowner's conduct would simply be 
too attenuated. 
Nevertheless, a more reasonable outcome may have been reached by 
applying the direct benefit requirement to the facts in Alcaraz. Vece re-
ceived no direct benefit or ad vantage from Alcaraz's use of the narrow 
strip of land in question or from the use of the water meter box. Vece was 
not put in a position to attract more tenants or increase rent because 
Alcaraz used the strip of land containing the water meter box. Although 
this narrow strip of land was near Vece's property, the strip in no way 
enhanced the value of his property. In short, Vece received no direct ad-
vantage or benefit from this strip of land surrounding the water meter 
91. See id. 
92. In each of the discussed cases, Johnston, Ross, and Southland, the relationship between 
the parties is business owner/customer. Even though the relationship between the parties in Alcaraz 
was not business owner/customer but was landlord/tenant, the benefit requirement can still apply 
to non-business owners of land. The reason why the benefit requirement applies not solely to a 
business owner/customer relationship is because imposing liability on landowners for injuries 
occurring on adjacent premises is especially appropriate when there is at least some causal 
connection between the off premises feature that caused the injury and the benefit or advantage 
the landowner receives when a person uses that feature. 
93. 929 P.2d at 1248-51. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. 
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box. As such, Vece should not be subject to liability for Alcaraz's inju-
nes. 
C. A landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby 
premises if the landowner has exercised substantial control over the 
nearby premises AND the landowner receives a direct benefit when the 
plaintiff uses the feature on the nearby premises which caused the injury 
The cases discussed thus far have required either "substantial con-
trol" alone or a "direct benefit" alone in order to justify subjecting a land-
owner to liability for an off-premises injury.95 There is also authority for 
combining these two requirements. In other words, a landowner may be 
subject to liability for off-premises injuries if the landowner both exer-
cises substantial control over the neighboring land and receives a direct 
benefit or advantage from the plaintiff's use of the land.96 
1. The cases 
Two recent California Court of Appeal cases in which landowners 
were found not liable for off-premises injuries are Swann v. Olivie~7 and 
Princess Hotels International., Inc. v. Superior Court98 • In Swann, the 
plaintiff was injured in the ocean in front of a homeowner association's 
private beach property.99 The plaintiff argued that the association failed to 
warn him of the dangerous condition of the surf. 100 The court restated the 
general principal that landowners are not held liable for off-premises in-
juries.101 This general rule, however, is subject to two exceptions. Land-
owners or businesses have been held liable for injuries not technically on 
their "premises" when: (1) they imposed or created some palpable exter-
nal effect on the area where the plaintiff was injured; or (2) they received 
a special commercial benefit from the area of the injury plus had direct or 
de facto control of that area. 102 
The California Court of Appeal held in Swann that the owners of a 
private beach do not own or control the ocean nor do they derive any di-
95. See supra notes 54-76, 80-91 and accompanying text. 
96. See Swann v. Olivier, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Princess Hotels 
Int'l, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1995). 
97. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Ct. App. 1994). 
98. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1995). 
99. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23. 
I 00. See id. at 24. 
101. See id. at 26. 
102. /d. (emphasis added). 
140 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
rect benefit from the plaintiff's use of the ocean. 103 Therefore, the owners 
of the private beach were not responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. 104 
Princess Hotels 105 is a similar case. A vacationing couple in Mexico 
went swimming in the ocean which was next to the hotel where they were 
staying. 106 Plaintiff was seriously injured, and her companion drowned 
when they were caught in the riptide. 107 The California Court of Appeal 
in Princess Hotels held that the defendant hotel owner had no duty to 
warn its guests as a matter of law .108 The court ruled that the hotel bene-
fitted from the ocean but lacked control 109 over the ocean. It then stated 
"[t]he California cases, as correctly analyzed by Swann, require control 
as well as a commercial benefit." 110 Accordingly, the court's analysis did 
not end with a finding that the hotel owner did not control the ocean. The 
court looked at the second part of the "control plus benefit" test and con-
cluded that the hotel did benefit from the plaintiff's use of the ocean. 111 
Hence, both Swann and Princess Hotels applied the control plus ben-
efit test to determine off premises liability. The difference between the 
two cases was that in Swann the landowner neither had control over nor 
benefitted from the ocean and in Princess Hotels the landowner did not 
have control over the ocean but did benefit from the plaintiff's use of the 
ocean. In both cases, because the landowners did not meet both parts of 
the control plus benefit test, the landowners were not liable for the off 
premises injuries. 
2. Comparison of the substantial control and direct benefit test to the 
facts in Alcaraz 
Applying the control plus benefit standard to Alcaraz again leads to 
the conclusion that the landowner should not be held responsible for 
Alcaraz's injuries. Even assuming, arguendo, that Vece's actions did 
amount to sufficient control over the premises to give rise to a duty, Vece 
would still have to receive some advantage from Alcaraz's use of the nar-
row strip of land in question. As discussed in sections B-1 and B-2 of this 
analysis, clearly Vece received no such advantage. 
103. !d. at 28. 
104. See id. 
105. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1995). 
I 06. See id. at 458. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. at 460. 
I 09. See id. at 460-61. In other words, even though the landowner met one part of the test 
(benefit), the landowner did not meet the other part of the test (control) and thus was not liable. 
110. /d. at 461. 
Ill. See id. 
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D. A landowner may be held liable for injuries occurring on a nearby 
premises if the landowner knew or should have known of the potential 
danger on the nearby land and failed to take reasonable steps to reduce 
the chance of a foreseeable injury 
One further example of landowner liability for off-premises injuries 
occurs when the landowner knew or should have known about the dan-
gerous condition on nearby land and failed to take any reasonable steps to 
reduce the chance of an injury. One of the several cases addressing this 
issue is Bober v. New Mexico State Fair. 112 In that case a motorist who 
was injured in a collision with another vehicle as it exited the state fair-
grounds after a concert sued the state fair. The court held that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed as to whether the state fair could reasonably 
have foreseen the risk of accident arising from the stream of traffic leav-
ing the fairground parking lot after a concert. 113 The court stated: "[T]he 
extent of an existing duty of care [is] to be determined not with reference 
to physical locations, but rather with reference to the foreseeability of 
harm from the hazardous condition."114 
The Restatement of Torts also adheres to this foreseeability approach. 
If the possessor of the land realizes or should have realized that an artifi-
cial condition on adjacent land poses an unreasonable risk of harm, and 
reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe, then the pos-
sessor of land is subject to liability for injuries caused by the artificial 
condition. 115 
Scattered through the Alcaraz opinion are hints of the foreseeability 
issue. 116 A more predictable· and reliable outcome could have been 
reached by the California Supreme Court had it stressed the foreseeability 
112. 808 P.2d 614 (N.M. 1991). 
113. See id. at 618. 
114. /d. at 619 (quoting Udy v. Calvary Corp. 780 P.2d 1055, 1059-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989)); See also Tryon v. City of Lowell, 565 N.E.2d 456 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). In this case a 
twelve year old boy was struck by a train as he walked beside train tracks which were adjacent 
to school property. The boy intended to get to school by going through a hole in the fence which 
separated the school from the railroad tracks. In its decision the court emphasized that the principal 
and teachers of the school knew students regularly crossed the tracks to enter school property 
through a hole in the fence. The principal and teachers were aware of the danger on the adjacent 
premises yet took no steps to reduce the danger. As a result, the court held that "[a] private 
landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to protect lawful entrants against foreseeable dangers on 
adjacent property." /d. at 457. 
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 364 (1996). 
116. 929 P.2d at 1242-44. The court mentions that there may have been evidence of "actual 
notice." Alcaraz submitted a declaration of a neighbor who resided in the same building who 
claims to have informed Vece on several occasions that the cover of the water meter box is either 
broken or missing. /d. at 1242. The court also discusses Hamilton and remarks that the reason why 
the landowner was held not liable was because the landowner had no actual notice of the 
dangerous condition on the neighboring land. /d. at 1244. 
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test. The issue of whether Vece knew or should have known of the bro-
ken or missing water meter box is a critical point. 
Perhaps the questions that the court should have sent back to the jury 
are: Did Vece know or should he have known that the broken or missing 
water meter box posed a potential hazard on adjacent property? Instead, 
the question sent back for the jury to determine was whether Vece "exer-
cised control over the strip of land owned by the city so as to give rise to 
a duty to protect or warn persons entering the land." 117 If he did know or 
should have known, did he take any steps to reduce the likelihood of in-
jury?118 The facts given in the majority's opinion are unclear as to Vece's 
knowledge of the dangerous condition. Alcaraz submitted a declaration of 
a neighbor who resided in the same building who claims to have informed 
Vece on several occasions that the cover of the water meter box was ei-
ther broken or missing. 119 There is no reference to Vece admitting or de-
nying that he was informed by another tenant of the broken or missing 
water meter box. Therefore, this question appears to be a question for the 
jury to decide. 
If the California Supreme Court in Alcaraz had followed this tradi-
tional foreseeability test and sent the foreseeability question back to a 
jury, its holding would have been more consistent with the typical situa-
tions where landowners are held liable for injuries which occur on adja-
cent premises. 
An additional case addressing the foreseeability issue is Contreras v. 
Anderson, 120 which illustrates the problems and uncertainty created by 
Alcaraz. In this case the plaintiff, Leticia Contreras, slipped and fell on a 
brick pathway between the curb and the sidewalk in front of the defen-
dant landowner's home. 121 The undisputed evidence at trial revealed that 
at the time of the alleged fall, the brick pathway or planting strip122 was 
owned by the City of Berkeley. 123 The thirteen-foot-wide strip of land 
owned by the city extended from the curb of the street to the landowner's 
property line. 124 The plaintiff claimed that even though the landowner did 
117. /d. at 1253. This issue sent back to a jury raises an interesting point. When there are 
no disputes as to the facts. should not a court determine, as a matter of law, the existence of a 
duty? See Casa de Cambio Comdiv, S.A. De C.V. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 115 F.3d 618, 620 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Carlson v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 473 S.E.2d 631, 635-36 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996). However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
118. For example, did Vece put a board over the broken portion of the meter box? Did he 
call a city employee who would have authority to fix the water meter box? 
119. See 929 P.2d at 1242. 
120. 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1997). 
121. See id. at 70. 
122. This brick pathway is also referred to as a planting strip. !d. at 71. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
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not own the land where the injury occurred, the landowner nonetheless 
exercised sufficient control over the land to give rise to a duty. 125 As evi-
dence of this control, plaintiff pointed to the fact that the landowner 
trimmed the tree on the strip of land, planted and removed flowers from 
the strip of land, and swept leaves off of the strip of land. 126 Plaintiff 
claimed that pursuant to Alcaraz, the "evidence is sufficient to raise a 
triable issue of fact whether [Vece] controlled the public planting strip 
and, thus, owed [plaintiff] a duty of care." 127 The California Court of Ap-
peal disagreed with the plaintiff's contention and ruled that the land-
owner cannot be held liable for the injuries the plaintiff suffered on the 
city-owned strip of land. 128 To sidestep the ultimate holding in Alcaraz, 
which stated that control is a triable issue of fact for a jury, the court in 
Contreras reasoned that "it is clear from Alcaraz that simple maintenance 
of an adjoining strip of land owned by another does not constitute an ex-
ercise of control over that property."129 
If it had been so clear that simple maintenance was insufficient con-
trol to give rise to a duty in Alcaraz, then the California Supreme Court 
would have held such. In other words, the Alcaraz court would have ex-
plicitly held that mowing the strip of lawn was not enough control to give 
rise to a duty. The California Supreme Court, however, held that the issue 
of control was a triable issue of fact for a jury to decide. Accordingly, by 
stating that it is clear in Alcaraz that simple maintenance is not enough 
control to give.rise to a duty, the court in Contreras is attempting to by-
pass the confusion produced by Alcaraz in order to do justice by declar-
ing the landowner not liable for the off premises injury. 130 
Additionally, the landowners in Contreras claimed that they had 
never received any complaints that the strip of land was a hazard or in 
need of repair. 131 In other words, it was not foreseeable to the landowners 
that someone could be hurt on this strip of adjacent land. The court, in 
analyzing this foreseeability issue, struggled to find guidance from the 
California Supreme Court in Alcaraz but finally concluded that the 
Alcaraz court "did not analyze the issue in detail." 132 Recognizing that 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. Id. at 70. 
128. See id. at 77. 
129. Id. at 75. 
130. The Contreras court emphasizes the fact that, in Alcaraz, the landowner (in addition 
to mowing the lawn) placed a fence around the water meter box after the injury. The Contreras 
court reasoned that placing a fence around the meter box is more control than just mowing the 
lawn. and thus the landowner's actions in Alcaraz went beyond mere neighborly maintenance. /d. 
at 75-76. 
131. /d. at 75. 
132. /d. at 74 n.lO. 
144 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
foreseeability is an important factor in the court's analysis, the court in 
Contreras stated: "Thus it appears the duty recognized in Alcaraz is lim-
ited to hazards on adjacent property of which the defendant landowner is 
actually aware or should be aware ... .''133 If the California Supreme 
Court's decision in Alcaraz would have followed the traditional 
foreseeability test in determining if a landowner should be held liable for 
off-premises injuries, then there would have been no need for the 
Contreras court to sidestep the ultimate holding in Alcaraz nor attempt to 
decipher what appeared to be the court's reasoning. 
E. Alcaraz is bad public policy because it provides unfavorable 
incentives for landowners 
Landowners, now faced with the knowledge that mowing a small 
strip of grass on neighboring property may be enough control to create in 
them a duty of care, will cease neighborly good deeds. Now a landowner 
has an incentive to let a strip of grass next to his property, which he 
knows he does not own, grow wild. Alcaraz provides an incentive to 
cease any beautification activities on nearby land that make a community 
more attractive because it may result in potential liability. 
Apparently, to avoid liability, Vece should have ignored the strip of 
city owned lawn and let it grow out of control to the point where it be-
came a potential danger or an eye sore. Now Vece might be responsible 
for Alcaraz's injuries simply because the gardener, who was already out 
mowing the lawn, decided to take a few extra moments to mow the city 
owned strip of lawn to improve the appearance of the community. 
F. A suggestion for the legal analysis for determining adjacent 
premises liability 
A more reasonable outcome may have been reached in Alcaraz in 
determining adjacent premises liability by using one of the following 
tests: 
(1) Did the landowner exercise substantial control over the 
adjacent premises, and/or134 did the landowner receive a direct 
benefit or advantage due to the plaintiff's use of the adjacent 
premises? 
133. See id. at 75 n.JO (emphasis added). The Contreras court makes this inference based 
on the Alcaraz court's discussion of Hamilton where, according to the Alcaraz majority, the 
landowner was held to have no duty because he had no actual notice of a danger on an adjacent 
premises. !d. 
134. See supra notes 54-Ill and accompanying text. The link between "substantial control" 
and "benefit" does not have to be "and," it could be "or." Some courts will look at "substantial 
control" only and not require "benefit." See supra notes 54-79. 
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(2) Was the injury which occurred on adjacent premises fore-
seeable and if the injury was foreseeable, did the landowner 
take any reasonable steps to reduce the chance of injury? 
(3) Did the landowner create or aggravate the hazardous 
condition where the plaintiff was injured?135 
145 
Applying the above analysis to the facts of Alcaraz v. Vece leads to 
the following conclusions: Under the first part of the first test, mowing 
the lawn where the meter box was located would not rise to the level of 
substantial control. Putting up a fence after the injury would also not rise 
to the level of substantial control. Under the second part of the first test, 
Vece received no direct benefit or advantage from Alcaraz's use of the 
narrow strip of land in question or from the use of the water meter box. 
Therefore, utilizing the first rule, Vece would not be liable. 
Under the second test, if Vece knew or should have known of the po-
tential hazard on the adjacent land and took no reasonable steps to reduce 
the chance of an injury, then he would be subject to liability for Alcaraz's 
injuries. 136 This analysis would require a determination that Vece was 
aware of the hazard and did not act. 
The third test does not apply to the facts in this case since Vece did 
not create the hazard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The California Supreme Court in Alcaraz v. Vece would have reached 
a more reasonable conclusion if it had applied the reliable traditional 
analysis for determining adjacent premises liability. Instead, what lower 
courts in California are left to deal with is an unnecessary and unpredict-
able expansion of premises liability. A portion of Justice Brown's dis-
senting opinion in Alcaraz provides an appropriate summary: "This case 
should be governed by the venerable judicial maxim: '[I]f it ain't broke, 
don't fix it.' Unfortunately, the majority fails to heed this sensible 
advice ... .'' 137 
The holding in Alcaraz weakens the substantial control test, removes 
the benefit test, and disregards the foreseeability test for determining ad-
jacent premises liability. Now landowners cannot rely on long-standing 
135. As mentioned in footnote 8, this test is not at issue in Alcaraz and is not discussed in 
this Note, but it is, nonetheless, an important test in detennining adjacent premises liability 
generally. 
136. The foreseeability of injury should be a question of fact for a jury to detennine. Cf 
McDennott v. Midland Management, Inc., 997 F.2d 768 (lOth Cir. 1993) (holding foreseeability 
is a question of fact for a jury); LeBlanc v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 688 A.2d 556 (N.H. 
1997) (holding foreseeability is a question of fact for jury detennination). 
137. Alcaraz v. Vece, 929 P.2d 1239, 1266 (Cal. 1997) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
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precedent to anticipate what acts could make them responsible for inju-
ries occurring on neighboring land. 
Thomas D. lex 
